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The Adversary Model is Bent
by William T. Pizzi, Phillip S. Figa
and Kenneth E. Barnhill, Jr.
William T. Pizzi, Boulder, is the Associate Dean at
the University of Colorado School of Law. Phillip
S. Figa, Denver, is with the firm of Burns & Figa,
P.C. Kenneth E. Barnhill, Jr., Denver, is with the
firm of Lohf & Barnhill, P.C.
Several years ago Marvin Frankel, who
was then a federal judge in the Southern
District of New York, wrote a controversial
law review article entitled "The Search of
Truth: An Umpireal View. "I In his article
Judge Frankel argued that our adversary sys-
tem rates truth too low. He suggested sev-
eral sweeping changes in the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility ("Code") which
would change the adversary model in the
pursuit of what Frankel called "the whole
truth."
Judge Frankel is a member of the Kutak
Commission and it would be inaccurate to
say that the proposed Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct ("Model Rules ") simply
embody the views of Judge Frankel.
Nonetheless, one can see throughout the
Model Rules a softening of the adversary
role of the lawyer. In many cases lawyers
would be required, or at least urged, to dis-
close voluntarily information adverse to a
client that would not be disclosed today
either because such information would be
viewed as confidential or because such dis-
closure would be viewed simply as being
disloyal to the client, especially when such
disclosure might lead to a less favorable
result for the client.
This article considers the Model Rules
which define the lawyer's role as an advo-
cate and the lawyer's role as a negotiator. A
new role permitted by the Model Rules-the
role of the lawyer as an "intermediary"
between two clients-is also considered.
THE LAWYER AS ADVOCATE
Perjury and the Disclosure of Client
Confidences
As initially adopted, there was confusion
in the Code over the proper role of a lawyer
in the situation where the lawyer's client
takes the stand and commits perjury by tell-
ing a story completely at odds with what the
client has previously told the lawyer. While
the Code requires a lawyer to protect client
confidences, DR 4-O1(C)(2) permits dis-
closure "when permitted under Disciplinary
Rules." DR 7-102(B)(1) of the Code re-
quires a lawyer whose client has "perpe-
trated a fraud upon . . . a tribunal" to try to
get the client to rectify the fraud and, if the
client refuses, to reveal the fraud to the tri-
bunal.
In 1974, the uncertainty over the lawyer's
apparently conflicting obligations to the
client and to the court was resolved when
DR 7-102(B)(1) was qualified by providing
that a lawyer must disclose client fraud to a
tribunal "except when the information is
protected as a privileged communication."
Thus, DR 7-102(B)(1) as amended resolved
the tension between the lawyer's duty to the
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client and the lawyer's duty to the court in
favor of the client by giving precedence to
the duty to preserve confidences over the
duty to inform. 2
The Model Rules in Rule 3.1(b) reverse
the Code by requiring disclosure to the court
of false testimony "even if doing so requires
disclosure of a confidence of the client. "
The CBA Ethics Subcommittee feels
strongly that this provision as it applies to a
client's confidences should be changed. The
disclosure of client confidences even to cor-
rect client perjury would undercut the
lawyer-client relationship. While client per-
jury places a lawyer in a uncomfortable posi-
tion, the present balance which gives prece-
dence to the duty to preserve confidences
over the duty to inform is necessary to pre-
serve the trust which must exist between
lawyer and client.
A lawyer must be able to assure his client
that what the client tells the lawyer is pro-
tected from disclosure by the lawyer and the
client must be able to rely upon this assur-
ance. If the relationship were otherwise, the
lawyer's effectiveness in representing the
client would be undermined because of the
lack of truth and candor in that relationship.
(See the Symposium article entitled "The
Lawyer-Client Relationship as Autonom-
ous" in which confidentiality is discussed in
detail.)
Disclosure of Evidence Favorable
to the Adverse Party
Another troubling aspect of Rule 3.1 is
paragraph (e) which reads as follows:
Except as provided in paragraph (f), a
lawyer may apprise another party of
evidence favorable to that party. . . .
Paragraph (f) provides that a defense
lawyer in a criminal case "is not required to
apprise the prosecutor of evidence adverse
to the accused." The exact intent of Rule
3.1(e) is unclear, for the Rule is written in
terms of "may," not "shall," and it
suggests or at least implies that with the
exception of criminal defense lawyers,
litigators should disclose adverse evidence
to the other side.
Of course, prosecutors have for a long
time been under both an ethical and constitu-
tional obligation to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the defense. The Code imposes
such an obligation in DR 7-103 and the
Model Rules also incorporate the same obli-
gation in Rule 3.10(d). However, Rule
3.1(e) goes beyond dealing with the obliga-
tions of prosecutors and appears to apply to
all advocates, including those in civil cases.
The Subcommittee is troubled by this
provision. While the provision is written in
permissive terms, the reference to the excep-
tion for defense counsel who are "not re-
quired" to disclose such adverse evidence
makes it appear that, except for the defense
lawyer, the disclosure of evidence favorable
to another party is professionally proper and
perhaps mandatory.
Even if Rule 3.1(e) is read as being totally
permissive, the Subcommittee concludes
that this provision should be deleted. There
are no standards or guidelines controlling
the disclosure of such evidence. Some
courts or grievance committees might read
Rule 3.1(e) as requiring disclosure and thus
mandatory. This would radically change the
nature of litigation and the discovery pro-
cess. In short, Rule 3.1(e) on the disclosure
of favorable evidence to another party is
viewed by the Subcommittee as. not only
unhelpful but a cause for alarm.
The Advocate as a Witness
The Code in DR 5-101 and DR 5-102
provides that lawyers should not accept
employment or continue to represent a client
in litigation when the lawyer will or ought to
be called as a witness at the trial. There are
some exceptions to this prohibition; for
example, if the testimony of the lawyer re-
lates to a technical or uncontested matter or
the withdrawal would work a "substantial
hardship on the client because of the distinc-
tive value of the lawyer," then the lawyer
may represent the client.
The Model Rules are substantially similar
to the current provisions of the Code with
one major exception, which could be of im-
portance to law firms. The Code treats a
2578 December
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lawyer and a law firm the same, requiring
withdrawal if the lawyer or a member of the
firm will be an important witness. The
Model Rules, however, in Rule 3.9(b) pro-
vide that a lawyer may continue to act as an
advocate if a member of the lawyer's firm
will be a witness-unless it creates a conflict
of interest. Conflicts of interest are defined
as those circumstances in which a lawyer
has interests, commitments or respon-
sibilities that may adversely affect the rep-
resentation of a client.3 In those instances,
representation of the client must be de-
clined. However, conflicts of interest can be
waived upon disclosure to and consent by
the client and provided that the services of
the lawyer can be performed without violat-
ing other rules of professional conduct. (For
a full treatment of conflicts of interest, see
the Symposium article entitled "Limited
Loyalty.")
The interplay of the disqualification of a
firm when a lawyer of that firm will be a
witness on behalf of a client and the prohibi-
tion against conflicts of interest is not spell-
ed out in the Model Rules. The Comment to
Rule 3.9 explains the rationale behind the
different treatment of the lawyer-as-a-
witness conflict when a firm is involved in
the following way:
The situation is usually quite different
when different lawyers in the same firm
or department are involved as advocate
and witness. If a single laywer is in-
volved, intermixing the roles of advo-
cate and witness is unavoidable. On the
other hand, if different lawyers are in-
volved, the testimony of the lawyer-
witness ordinarily can be presented by
an advoacte from the same office with-
out undue confusion. The essential
problem is that of assessing the relative
significance of the burden on the client
of having to retain different counsel,
the burden on the opposing party of
confronting an advocate-witness, and
the risk of serious conflict of interest
between the firm involved and its
client.4
It is apparent here that Model Rule 3.9 tends
to favor the firm as against the sole prac-
titioner in this conflict of interest situation.
The Subcommittee finds that the Model
Rule on vicarious disqualification in the
advocate-witness situation is incomplete.
Part of the problem facing the advocate-
witness is the possible conflict of interest
should the lawyer's testimony be adverse to
the client. Also of importance is the jury
confusion that may be caused by a lawyer
testifying as a witness and arguing as an
advocate in the same case. The Model Rule,
which allows a member of a firm to be a
witness while another member of the firm is
arguing the case, speaks only to a conflict of
interes with the client. The Subcommittee
suggests that the Rule be expanded to avoid
jury confusion by providing, for example,
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that the lawyer who will be a witness have
no other role in the courtroom than that as a
witness.
Other Rules of Advocacy
There are two other provisions in the
Model Rules on the role of the lawyer as
advocate that deserve mention because they
would change the Code, although they are
not as controversial as those discussed
above.
First, Rule 3.3 deals more aggressively
with the issue of delay than does the Code.
Not only are frivolous motions for purposes
of delay improper, but the Rule provides
that every lawyer has an affirmative obliga-
tion to expedite litigation. Delay simply to
further the financial interest of a client "is
not a legitimate interest of the client" which
a lawyer should try to seek. While this may
be only a change in emphasis, the strong
statement against improper delay is wel-
comed by the Subcommittee.
A second change that seems sensible to
the Subcomittee is an expanded obligation
on the part of counsel to inform the court of
pertinent legal authorities. The Code in DR
7-106(B)(1) obligates lawyers to inform the
court only of "directly adverse" legal au-
thority in "the controlling jurisdiction. "
Model Rule 3.1(c) broadens that obligation
by requiring lawyers to inform the court of
any legal authority "known to the lawyer
that would probably have a substantial effect
on the determination of a material issue. "
The following principle underlies this Rule:
Legal argument is a discussion among
the advocates and the tribunal, seeking
to determine the legal premises prop-
erly applicable to the case. The extent
of disclosure is at times a matter of
judgment. An advocate is not required
to present the full array of opposing
authority. Where the lawyer knows of
authority that the court clearly ought to
consider, the court should be advised of
its existence if the opposing party has
not done so.s
By the same token, baseless or frivolous
legal argument is not condoned because it
would be in fact misleading. The Model
Rule eliminates the ambiguity of "directly
adverse" legal authority and the questiona-
ble criterion of "the controlling jurisdic-
tion" as now provided in the Code. In the
Subcommittee's judgment, this provision is
an improvement over the Code.
Although the Subcommittee finds the
Rules to be some improvement over the
Code, their reaction to the section on the role
of the advocate is, on balance, severely nega-
tive. The Subcommittee feels that the com-
plete reversal from the Code on the disclo-
sure of a client's false testimony would in-
jure severely the confidential relationship
between the lawyer and the client. The Sub-
committee is also very troubled by Rule
3.1(e), which seems to suggest that lawyers
ought to disclose adverse evidence. Even if
rules such as these would produce "the
whole truth," the Subcommittee feels that
the sacrifice of an important premise-
confidentiality in the lawyer-client
relationship-is too high a price.
THE LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR
Section 4 of the ten sections of the Model
Rules is devoted exclusively to the role of
the lawyer as negotiator. Lawyers in all
areas of specialty spend considerable time as
negotiators. The client's cause or desires
often may be best advanced through a
negotiated settlement of civil litigation,
compromise in a business deal or plea bar-
gaining in a criminal case. The Model Rules
mandate that a lawyer adopt a negotiating
stance that is less adversarial and more con-
ciliatory than what appears to be permitted
under the Code.
Under the Model Rules, a lawyer would
be required to bend over backwards out of an
overabundance of fairness when functioning
as a negotiator. The Model Rules seek to
convey a new mood in negotiations-
lawyers must value scrupulous fairness to
opposing parties and their lawyers in negoti-
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their own clients. Whether such a concept
can be adopted in practice is uncertain.
What is certain is that the change in attitude
demanded by the Model Rules would create
new uncertainties in the negotiating context.
Negotiations Under the Code
The Code does not single out the negotia-
tion process as a distinct subject for gui-
dance regarding professional conduct. A
lawyer's conduct during negotiations on be-
half of a client is governed by the general
maxims and precepts of the Code.
Canon 7 of the Code requires that "A
Lawyer Should Represent A Client Zeal-
ously Within The Bounds Of The Law."
DR 7-102 requires, among other things, that
a lawyer shall not engage in illegal or
fraudulent conduct or counsel or assist his
client to engage in such conduct. That Dis-
ciplinary Rule also provides that if a lawyer
learns that his client has perpetrated a fraud
upon a person, the lawyer shall reveal the
fraud to the affected person, except when
the information constitutes a privileged
communication.
DR 7-104 requires that lawyers not com-
municate with an opposing party known to
be represented by a lawyer, unless the in-
quiring lawyer has the prior consent of the
lawyer representing such other party, or is
authorized by law to do so. Also, EC 7-10
states:
The duty of a lawyer to represent his
client with zeal does not militate against
his concurrent obligation to treat with
consideration all persons involved in
the legal process and to avoid the inflic-
tion of needless harm.
In sum, these provisions of the Code provide
little guidance to a practicing attorney as to
the obligations of professional conduct in a
negotiating context, except for a minimum
standard of fairness.
The Model Rules and Negotiations
The Model Rules change the format of
professional responsibility concepts as
applied to negotiations by specifically
focusing on the negotiating context and the
role of the lawyer as a negotiator. The Intro-
duction to the section of the Model Rules
which applies to the lawyer as negotiator
provides an overview and certain guidelines
which a lawyer should follow in represent-
ing a client in negotiations. Its tone is con-
ciliatory. For example, it states, "The
lawyer should help the client appreciate the
interest and position of the other party and
should encourage concessions that will ef-
fectuate the client's larger objectives." The
Subcommittee feels that such a course of
conduct is desirable under some, but not all,
circumstances. While the intent is laudable,
the Introduction may create confusion in the
mind of any lawyer reading it as to the re-
quirements of proper conduct in negotia-
tions because it appears to be primarily aspi-
rational and provides little concrete gui-
dance.
Disclosures to a Client
The first requirement in the Model Rules
when a lawyer conducts negotiations on be-
half of a client is that the lawyer must inform
the client of relevant facts and communica-
tions from the other side, including offers.6
This is consistent with EC 7-7 of the Code,
and appears to be duplicative of Rule 1.4 of
the Model Rules which requires "Adequate
Communications" in all lawyer-client rela-
tions. The Subcommittee has no objection to
elevating to a mandatory rule the require-
ment that a lawyer inform his client fully of
the material aspects of any negotiations. In
effect, this Model Rules changes an aspira-
tional statement in the Code to a duty when a
lawyer negotiates on behalf of a client.
Fairness to Other Participants
Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules requires a
lawyer to deal fairly with other participants
in negotiations, avoid sham negotiation and
otherwise avoid legal and ethical impro-
prieties. For the most part, Rule 4.2 is a
paraphrase of DR 7-102 and DR 7-104. One
2582 December
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significant change, however, is paragraph
(b) of Rule 4.2, which, among other things,
provides:
A lawyer shall not . . . fail to disclose
a material fact known to the lawyer,
even if adverse, when disclosure
is . . . necessary to correct a manifest
misapprehension of fact or law result-
ing from a previous representation
made by the lawyer or known by the
lawyer to have been made by the
client. . . .
This requirement appears to differ from
the Code because, under Rule 4.2, a lawyer
must disclose in negotiations adverse facts
where the other side misapprehended a pre-
vious representation, even where the previ-
ous representation constituted full and hon-
est disclosure by the lawyer or the lawyer's
client. Thus, under Rule 4.2, a lawyer has
an obligation to rectify unilateral mistakes
about facts or law made by other parties or
their counsel, even in the absence of fraud or
negligence by the lawyer and his or her
client.
The Subcommittee is divided as to
whether a lawyer should be required to cor-
rect unilateral mistakes made by opposing
counsel or other negotiating adversaries.
Aside from not understanding the contours






Subcommittee believe that in a negotiating
context lawyers have no obligation to pro-
tect opposing parties and their counsel from
their own self-created errors. On the other
hand, the Subcommittee recognizes that
disclosures as required pursuant to Rule
4.2(b) may foster attainment of a client's
objectives in the long run and therefore the
requirement has merit.
In any event, the Subcommittee is in
unanimous agreement that in the context of
litigation, particularly during settlement
discussions after the commencement of
trial, this disclosure obligation of Rule
4.2(b) should not apply because of the over-
lapping obligations of a lawyer as an advo-
cate and as a negotiator. Thus, for example,
if the lawyer representing a party in litiga-
tion negotiates a settlement with opposing
counsel who is negotiating under the er-
roneous premise that the testimony of a wit-
ness at trial was complete and accurate, the
lawyer should not be required to correct that
erroneous impression of opposing counsel,
The Subcommittee on the whole is wary
of the thrust of Rule 4.2, which is entitled
"Fairness to Other Participants." Lawyers
should not have any affirmative obligation
to be "fair" with those persons on the other
side of the negotiating table because the
term "fairness" is fraught with ambiguity.
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It is believed, however, that lawyers should
be honest and not mislead adversaries.
Thus, the Subcommittee thinks that both in
title and substance Rule 4.2 should be
changed to "Honesty to Other Partici-
pants. "
Illegal, Fraudulent or Unconscionable
Transactions
Rule 4.3 prohibits a lawyer from conclud-
ing an agreement, or assisting a client in
concluding an agreement, that would be il-
legal, fraudulent or unconscionable. It is con-
sistent with DR 7-102(A)(7) and DR
7-102(A)(8), which prohibit a lawyer from
counseling or assisting a client in conduct
that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudu-
lent, or knowingly engaging in illegal con-
duct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary
Rule. Rule 4.3 is actually narrower than the
Code in that the Rule applies only to the end
result of negotiations, mainly concluding an
agreement, rather than to improper conduct
occurring during the course of negotiations.
However, Rule 4.3, in conjunction with
Rule 4.2, covers the entire scope of the
negotiation process including its formal
consumation. The Subcommittee thus has
no objection to the adoption of this Rule.
Conclusion as to New Negotiator Rules
The Model Rules as they apply to negotia-
tions for the most part are edifying and use-
ful. Those Rules seek to minimize comba-
tiveness and emphasize candor. In an overly
litigious society, such an attitude is a virtu-
ous sentiment. However, in a code of pro-
fessional conduct, any disclosure require-
ment to the extent that it requires correcting
an adversary's unilateral mistakes com-
promises a lawyer's effectiveness and obli-
gations as an advocate. Indeed, under the
Model Rules, a client sometimes may be
better off strategically by undertaking
negotiations himself, rather than through a
lawyer. The client would not be bound by
rules of "fairness" which might undercut
some of the effectiveness of the lawyer as a
negotiator.
THE LAWYER AS INTERMEDIARY
Should a lawyer be allowed to act as an
intermediary between two clients whose in-
terests differ? Are there circumstances in
which a lawyer may perform a valuable pub-
lic service by attempting to complete a
transaction or resolve a minor dispute
among several clients?
It is axiomatic that it is in the interest of
the legal profession to attempt to find ways
to provide legal services at lower costs.7 A
lawyer who represents two different clients
who become involved in the same transac-
tion would probably be able to represent
both clients more economically than if two
or more lawyers were needed to handle the
same transaction. However, the appro-
priateness of a lawyer acting as an inter-
mediary between two clients continues to be
the subject of considerable debate.
The Present Code and Multiple
Representation
The Code prohibits representation of mul-
tiple clients if the interests of the clients
differ, whether such interests be conflicting,
inconsistent, diverse or otherwise discor-
dant and if employment by one client will
adversely affect the lawyer's judgment on
behalf of or dilute his loyalty to the other
client or clients. A lawyer may represent
multiple clients if each is fully informed of
the potential conflict of interests, if each con-
sents to the multiple representation, and if
the interests do not become actually differ-
ing.8 Of course, if a serious conflict de-
velops, then a lawyer will probably have to
withdraw from representing any of the
clients.
The Definition of a New Role
The Model Rules attempt to change these
concepts and to provide guidelines for a
lawyer acting as an "intermediary" be-
tween two or more clients.
The numerous conditions which must be
met before a lawyer can properly act as
intermediary are best explained by quoting
the Rule:
2584 December
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5.1 Conditions for Acting as an Inter-
mediary
(a) A lawyer may act as an inter-
mediary between clients if:
(1) The possibility of adjusting the
clients' interests is strong; and
(2) Each client will be able to
make adequately informed deci-
sions in the matter, and there is
little likelihood that any of the
clients will be significantly prej-
udiced if the contemplated adjust-
ment of interests is unsuccessful;
and
(3) The lawyer can act impartially
and without improper effect on
other services the lawyer is per-
forming for any of the clients; and
(4) The lawyer fully explains to
each client the implications of the
common representation, including
the advantages and risks involved,
and obtains each client's consent to
the common representation.
(b) While serving as intermediary a
lawyer shall explain fully to each
client the decisions to be made and
the considerations relevant to mak-
ing them, so that each client can
make adequately informed deci-
sions.
The lawyer role of the intermediary under
the Model Rule should be assumed only
after full disclosure and informed consent by
the clients. The clients must understand that
the lawyer could not act as an advocate or
negotiator in the traditional sense.
Rule 5.2 of the Model Rules governs
withdrawal as an intermediary. It requires
that a lawyer withdraw if either client so
requests, if any of the conditions set forth in
Rule 5.1 quoted above cannot be met, or if it
becomes apparent that a mutually advan-
tageous adjustment of interests cannot be
made. The Rule then states that a lawyer
may continue to represent any of the clients
only to the extent compatible with his or her
responsibilities to the other client or clients.
Subcommittee's Conclusion-A Split
Decision
The Subcommittee believes that although
there are potential advantages to clients
when a lawyer serves as intermediary, if the
differences between the clients deepen, as
often happens in negotiations or other at-
tempts at dispute resolution, the lawyer not
only will be unable to continue to function as
an intermediary for the clients, but will
likely have to withdraw from representing
any of the parties. This may result in addi-
tional costs to the clients and embarrassment
and recrimination for the lawyer.
Problems of confidentiality and
attorney-client privilege are significant
when a lawyer acts as an intermediary.
Maintaining adequate communication with
each client as required by other Rules while
protecting client confidences would require
a delicate balance in that relationship. If
such balance cannot be maintained, the
common representation is improper. Furth-
ermore, it must be assumed that in the event
of litigation between the clients, none of the
lawyer's communications or the communi-
cations between the clients would be pro-
tected by the lawyer-client confidence
privilege.
The Subcommittee is evenly divided ori
the intermediary rule. Some of the members
conclude that there are special, limited cir-
cumstances in which an attorney may per-
form a real service for existing clients, at a
lower cost to them, by acting as inter-
mediary while still representing each party
and performing all the tasks required of an
attorney in such a representative capacity.
Other members of the Subcommittee rec-
ognize the social desirability of economy in
the rendition of legal services but feel that
the occasions on which a lawyer could suc-
cessfully act as an intermediary are likely to
be very few. Moreover, it is thought that, as
a practical matter, it is impossible to repre-
sent one client in matters involving another
client without compromising the interests of
one of the clients.
1980 2585
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This division within the Subcommittee
indicates that the specification of the lawyer
role of intermediary and the rules of profes-
sional conduct incident to that role are mat-
ters which will require further analysis and
discussion. Since the enumeration of the
intermediary role is a new concept, time and
study will be needed to digest its conse-
quences. As proposed in the Model Rules,
the lawyer role of intermediary does not fit
within the traditional idea of the advocate.
CONCLUSION
Without question, the proposed Model
Rules which deal with the roles of the lawyer
as advocate, negotiator and intermediary
raise some of the more complex and con-
troversial issues in the work of the Kutak
Commission. Tradition is being questioned
in the light of the needs for truth and justice
and the rendition of effective legal services
in contemporary society. Concepts long
deemed fundamental to the assurance that
the legal system will be just are under attack.
Without doubt, the issues raised in these
several proposed Rules touch and question
what many lawyers deem to be the very
essence of the nature and purpose of the
legal profession in the United States.
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on these issues, that debate will help to
clarify for lawyers the fundamental princi-
ples which guide them in being profession-
ally responsible. As a result, the limits, if
any, upon the role of the lawyer as an advo-
cate as well as the guidelines for profes-
sional conduct by lawyers in nonadvocacy
roles will be, or can be, made clearer.
The role of the lawyer in a corporate or
governmental organization poses special
problems in modern times. The next Sym-
posium article deals with the way in which
the Model Rules address these problems.
NOTES
1. 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. (1975), p. 1031.
2. See, ABA Committee on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility, Formal Opinion No.
341, Sept. 30, 1975.
3. ABA Commission on Evaluation of Pro-
fessional Standards, Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Jan. 30, 1980), Rule 1.8.
4. Id., Comment, Rule 3.9.
5. Id., Comment, Rule 3.1.
6. Id., Rule 4.1.
7. ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of
Ethical Standards, Code of Professional Respon-
sibility (1969), Canon 2; EC 2-1.
8. Id., DR 5-105(C); see also, EC 5-20 (the
lawyer acting as an impartial arbitrator or
mediator).
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THE COLORADO LAWYER Is now accept-
ing lawyer's announcementsl
The Ethics Committee of the Colorado Bar
Association has approved the use of such an-
nouncements in THE COLORADO LAWYER.
CBA members can purchase a 1/3-page dis-
play ad for $50 per insertion.
If you would like to announce a change of
address, an addition to your firm, or a change
of association, you can reach approximately
7,000 attorneys statewide by purchasing a
display ad in THE COLORADO LAWYER in
space set aside especially for this purpose.
Send your $50 check, made payable to the
Colorado Bar Association, with your an-
nouncement copy to our Editorial Offices by
the 10th of the month prior to publication. For
further information, call (303) 399-1070.
